RECENT CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The mere fact that it has engaged in the private enterprise
of dispensing alcoholic liquors does not so far divest a State
of its sovereignty as to render it liable to suit by
Sovereignty
a private individual. Murray v. Wilson Distilling
of
State
of t
Conductng
CO., 29 Supreme Court, 458.
Private

Business

(For a full discussion see note p. 37 of this
issue.)

CONTEMPT OF COURT.
During the pendency of an appeal in a criminal case to the
United States Supreme Court, it is contempt of that Court
for the Sheriff in charge of the prisoner to- fail
Duty of
sheriff to
to do all in his power to protect the prisoner from
Prisoner
the mob. United States v. Shipp, et al., 29 Supreme Court, 637.
(For a full discussion see note p. 35 of this issue.)

DAMAGES.
In .anison v. Ciemberland County, 39 Pa. Superior, 335, the
Court held that the Act of June 8, 19o7, P. L. 5o5; repealed
the Act of May I, i9o5, P. L. 318, in so far as

Road
Land Law,
Damages:
Chunge of

orade

it related to damages for a change of grade, and
dismissed a petition for the appointment of jurors
to assess damages.
(For a full discussion see note p. 39 of this

issue.)

RECENT CASES

EQUITY.
That the concurrent jurisdiction of courts of equity and of
law extends to the case of the recovery of money lost in gainIn. bling, is the decision of the Supreme Court of
MI o e y on -r
Moey Los,
Appeals of Westo Virginia in Berns v. Shaw, 64
Gaibling
Southeastern, 93 . The defendant contended that
the bill, which was for recovery of money lost at roulette, was

demurrable, inasmuch as there was no necessity for discovery,
and plaintiff had, therefore, a plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law.
But the Court, following the decision on the same subject in
McKinney v. Pope's Administrators, 3 B. Monroe (Ky.), 93
(1842), held that the remedy in this case was concurrent, not
only under statutory authority, but also on the principles of
public policy, which would lead to the conclusion that bioth
branches of the court should be open to a plaintiff seeking
recovery of money obtained from him by fraud.
The exact principle upon which this doctrine is based is
somewhat difficult to fathom, since there seems to be a clear
remedy at law, unless it rests upon the general rule that equity
has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law to grant relief
in all cases from consequences of fraud. Macey Co. v. Macey,
143 Mich. 138 (i9o6).

EVIDENCE.
Referring to the subject of the presumption of death, the
trial Judge charged that "the death of the party is presumed
by the law when he has been absent seven years
,-Mt
of Veth Afte without being heard from-absents himself. The
Seven wam
absence means from the locality where such party
has lived before, and is away from, and not being heard from
means not heard from in the locality which had been his home
and where he had lived." Held, error. Hansen v. Owens, 64
S. E. R. 8oo (Ga.).
The presumption of death after seven years' absence has
been a doctrine of the common law, universally recognized for
many years, and applies to all persons alike, except children of
a tender age. Manley v. Pattison, 73 Miss. 417, or persons
over one hundred years old-Young v. Shulenberg, x65 N. Y.
385. The lower Court in the present case, however, stated the
proposition much too broadly and ignored certain pre-requisites
of the presumption. It is not enough that a person "has not
been heard from in the locality which had been his home;" it
must also appear that he has not been heard from by those
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EVIDENCE (Continued).
who would be most apt to hear. Doe v. Azdrews, 15 Q. B. 756.
Mere absence is not stfficient, as the Sup-reme Court observed,
and no presumption will arise where it appears that one has
moved to another place.
In establishing the corpus delicti, the State has to accomplish
two tasks of very different degrees of difficulty. To prove
that a man is dead--even that he has been killedt Evidee is, as a rule, a comparatively simple thing; the
finding of a corpse is the usual opening of a murWelzht and
uficeny
der case. But to prove with any degree of certainty
that the accused was the responsible party is, on the other
hand, a very difficult thing. A murder is seldom witnessed;
the criminal is naturally cautious of detection, and consequently
the State is forced to rely largely upon either the testimony of
a single accidental witness; *or, as in many cases, to rely
solely upon the chain of facts which points strongly to one man
or another, in order to fasten the guilt upon the proper person.
The Courts have been conservative as to the weight to be
accorded to circumstantial evidence, as a dangerous weapon
in the hands of twelve" untutored men. But some Judges have
been inclined to carry this conservatism to the point of prejudice, and have instructed their juries in a fashion that speaks
rather of cowardice than of conscience, insisting that to justify
the inference of guilt from circumstantial evidence, the existence of inculpatory facts must be absolutely incompatible -with
the innocence of the accused, 'and incapable of explanation
upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt.
Thus, if every unontroverted fact pointed one man out as
a murderer, and a motive, moreover, was shown, still he must
go scot-free if some isolated circumstance might be found
upon vhich to build another hypothesis. Two of the older
text-writers have embodied this idea in their. treatises-Wills
in his "Circumstantial Evidence (p. 149), and Starkie "Evidence" (p. 838). But the view would be impossible in practice, since it would demand mathematical certainty in every
case, practically negativing any convictions.
SAll this is a super-sublimated state of the moral justice of
the Anglo-Saxon, and consequently the vast majority of Courts
and cases have been against it. Now and then, however, it
crops up-an instance appearing in a recent Wisconsin case.
A laborer had been found dead from a gunshot. Blood had
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been traced to the window of a nearby house, the screen of
that window exhibiting a bullet-tear. Inside, a gun With one
of the barrels discharged tallied in calibre with the death-dealing cartridge, and there was additional evidence of ill feeling on
the part of the householder toward the victim. On the strength
of these facts he was arrested, tried, and convicted, the evidence
being entirely circumstantial and the jury being instructed
to convict; "if the evidence established the material evidentiary
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt" Spick v..State, 121
N. W. Rep. 665.
An appeal was immediately taken on the ground that circumstantial evidence, to be efficient, must establish guilt with
some appreciably higher degree of certainty than direct evidence, and there being indications that some other than the
accused might have been responsible, the jury were not justified in their conviction. The Supreme Court quite properly
refused the prayer, holding circumstantial evidence to be ofn
a par With direct evidence. This is the view of the great
weight of authority. Re Thorne, 6 L. R. 49; Schwantes Case,
127 Wis. 6o; Whar. Cr. By., 9 Ed., p. io; Wigmore Ev., p. 26,
etc.
Blackstone divides presumptions into the violent, the probable, and the weak. B1. Com. 371. But such a classification
seems altogether useless, and the distinction to amount to nothing more than that in one case *the presumptive evidence may
be very strong, in another less so, and in another very weak.
The deciding factor in these cases is really the question of
motive. State v. Lane, 64 Mo. 319. No matter how suspicious
the accumulated facts might be, conviction would be impossible,' or at least improbable, so long as no ostensible reason for
the act might be shown-though motive in itself is not a
necessary element of proof. Taking this into consideration,
it is hard to see how circumstantial evidence can be an instrument of injustice, and many jurists have openly preferred it to
the other variety. "Circumstantial evidence," says Chief Justice Gibson in Com. .v. Harmnon, 4 Pa. 269, "is in the abstract
nearly, though perhaps not altogether as strong as positive evidence; in the concrete it may be infinitely stronger. A fact
positively sworn to by a single eye-witness of blemished character is not so satisfactorily proved as a fact which is the necessary consequence of a chain of facts sworn to by many
witnesses of undoubted credibility."
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The defendant was convicted of transporting liquors within a
city without having first obtained a permit as required by
statute. It appeared that. the liquors were shipped
Which liter- from another State, consigned in care of defend-'
ants, "consignees," underneath which appeared the
State CornThe Pont

mere Ends

names of the nineteen persons to whom the liquors

were to be distributed. The defendant contended that until
the goods reached these nineteen purchasers, they were still in
interstate transportation;. therefore the law could not apply
to such transportation without being. unconstitutional. Held,
there was evidence from, which a jury might find that the
defendant was engaged in interstate commerce, and the lower
Court had, therefore, erred in instructing the jury that no
question of interstate commerce was involved. Commonwealth

v. Peoples Express Co., 88 N. E. R. 420 (Mass.).
It was contended by the Commonwealth that the defendant
was merely the agent of the consignees, and this theory was
favored by the Court; but it was held that it was not, in reason,
impossible to'find that the defendant was the concluding link of
the interstate transportation, hence the question was for the jury.
Ithasbeenheldinthe case of Cary v. Eureka Springs R. Co., 7
I. C. Rep. 286, that wagon and team traffic could never come
within the clauses of the Interstate Commerce Act, but this
case was not adverted to, and the Court was here dealing with
a somewhat different proposition from the interpretation of
that act. The case illustrates the niceties of determining when
interstate commerce ends. The Wilson Act says "upon arrival"
in the State.-U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3177. This has been
held to mean not mere presence at thi boundary line, but delivery to the consignee.-Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S.412. Under
the "original package" doctrine, which necessitated the Wilson
Act, the Courts had gone so far as to allow an importer to resell within the State, if the original package had not been

broken. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. ioo. At the present time
the phrase "on'arrival" must be interpreted to fit each case as
it arises; delivery at a siding has been held to be no arrival.
State v. IntoxicatingLiquors, 94 Me. 335; and the only general
rule which has been forthcoming is that the transportation ends
upon arrival at destination and delivery to consignee, which
only postpones the difficulty, and leaves "destination" and "consignee" to be fought out in every case such as the present.
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LIBEL AND SLANDER.
The United States Supreme Court, in passing upon the question of the extent of the injury of a libel in order to make it
Extent of the actionable, in Peck v. Tribune Co., 29 Supreme
, jury to
Court Rep. 554, held that if the publication would
hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an important
Actionable
and respectable part of the community, it is actionable.
(For a full discussion of the facts and principles see note
.P. 45 of this issue.)

NEGLIGENCE.
City Councils authorized the use of certain streets for a
carnival, having no authority to do so. Booths were erected by
private individuals, in descending from one of

Liability of
Rey
Uf-Authorzed
Act.

which plaintiff was injured. Held, she can recover
from the city.
eastern, 8l5.

Van Cleef v. Chicago, 88 North-

(For a full discussion see note p.
issue.)
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
In the case of United States v. National Exchange Bank of
Providence, 29 Supreme Court Reporter, 665, the.Supreme
Court passed upon the right of the United States
Chks.1
to recover money paid to a bank upon a forged
Forged ipension check. A large number of pension vouchdorsements
ers were presented to the pension agent at
Boston, upon receipt of which he drew checks on the Subtreasury
in favor of the persons named in the voucherc and transmitted
the checks directly to them. They were presented to the bank
and paid, and they were later met by the Subtreasury when
forwarded for collection. Some time later it was discovered
that all, or nearly all of them were drawn in the names of parties who were either deceased or no longer entitled to a pension.
The United States, therefore, sued the banks to recover back
the amounts paid, and the Supreme Court, speaking through
IMr. Justice White, upheld its right to recover.
-
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (Continued).
The opinion outlines the method adopted by the Pension
Office to ascertain and check the identity of pensioners, consistiig as it does of duplicate pension vouchers, the signature on
which must correspond with the indorsement on the check, and
then goes on to show that the taking of such precautions by the
Government should not be held to raise a presumption of law
that the signatures are valid, to be relied upon by third parties.
The bank which pays to the one preserting the check is placed
upon inquiry as to its genuineness just as much as in the
ordinary case of negotiable instruments.
The same question had previously been passed upon by the
District Court for the Northern District of New York in
United States v. Onondaga County Savings Bank, 39 Federal,
259 (1889), and substantially the same conclusion reached.

TRUSTS.
X, president of the A Corporation of New Jersey, advanced
$4o,ooo to others in settlement of their claims against the corEnforcement poration, and acquired from them 5ooooo shares
Jurlsdicuon

of the corporation's capital stock. X died in Penn-

sylvania and the B bank in that State became his
executor. A claimed ownership of the stock subject only to the
tender of the $4o,ooo advanced, and filed a bill in chancery
therefor in New Jersey. B demurred to the jurisdiction. The
Court in deciding for the plaintiff corporation declared that
equity had jurisdiction to establish a trust in shares of stock
of a New Jersey corporation, though the trustee resided out
of the State and could not be served with process, but could
only be brought in by statutory proceedings against absent defendants. Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 73 Ati.
Rep. 249.
The fundamental doctrine of equity as originally administered was that its remedies and decrees operated in personam
upon defendants, and not in rem upon the subject-matter.
Thus, if a negligent trustee was within reach, a decree in chancery would be effective, regardless of the situs of the-trust res.
Kildare v. Eustace, i Vern. 4o5; but if the situation were
reversed, and merely the res were within the jurisdiction, equity
would be powerless.-Spurr v. ScoVill, 3 Cush. 578. This lack
has been remedied in most States by statute, so that at present
a decree will act quasi in rem against a foreign trustee where
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the rcs-is within the State.-Ames, Cases on Trusts, p. 29;
though the distinction between the statutory and the inherent
powers of a Court of Equity has not always been recognized.
See White v. White, 53 Md. 564; Curtis v. Smith, 6o Barb. 9.
Of course, if both res and trustee are out of the jurisdiction,
any decree of the Court would be brutem fuhnen. In the case
of shares of stock, where the company is within the State in
which the action is brought, and the certificate in the hands
of one who is sought to be made a trustee and who lives in the
foreign jurisdiction, in such case it is often a nice question
as to just what is the situs of the res. Stock-shares have much
in common with choses in action, and choses in action are held
to be situate at the place where they. can be most effectively
dealt with-that is, where the debtor or other person against
whom the claim exists resides.-Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 318-2o,
ist Am. Ed. But, on the other hand, since a complete and
effectual transfer of stock can only be had on the books of the
company, it is held that shares of stock, for purposes other
than taxation and similar purposes, are personal property,
whose location is in the State where the corporation is located.
Cook, Corp., 520. Foreign possession of the certificates, therefore, would be of no moment,--they would be only evidence
of ownership of the shares, and the interest represented by
those shares would: be held by the company for the benefit of
the true owner. As the habitation or domicile of the company
is, and must be, in the State that created it, the property represented by the certificate may be deemed to be held by the
company within the State whose creature it is, whenever it is
sought to determine who is the real owner. Jellenick v. Hurots
Copper Mining Co., x77 U. S. x.
Under the facts of the present case, therefore, the A Corporation would be the equitable owner of the stock in the State
in which it sued; the B bank becoming the trustee with possession of the mere evidences of title. No personal act would
be necessary in such case to vest title in the corporation, the
situation being different from a bill to remove a cloud on title
in real estate, where the statute must of necessity give the
decree the effect of a conveyance. A determination that the
stock belongs to the complainant becomes effective at once,
and the complainant may or may not issue new certificates
therefor. All the decree need do to effectuate the title is to
decree that the certificates in the hands of the defendant are null
and void.
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
A lent B a sum of money, taking as security a mortgage of
the latter's farm. The agreement included the proviso that the
said mortgage should become void upon the tender
Recording of
of the money. A recorded the instrument of
Deeds:
transfer which was in the form of a warranty
Notice
deed, though in fact a mortgage. Some years later the money
was returned to the creditor, who accordingly deeded back the
property.
B went into possession of the farm, and later leased it
to tenants, but never recorded the transfer in his own name.
Subsequently the land was attached by A's.creditors, was sold
by the sheriff, and bought by a stranger on the faith of the
record; and B, the actual owner, at once sued to clear his title.
It was decreed that a grantee in possession has title against
all the world, whether his deed is recorded or not; consequently,
the purchaser buying entirely upon the strength of the record
was left to a dubious remedy against those from whom he
ostensibly bought. Brady v. Sloinan, 12o N. W. 795.
The facts of this case are unusually interesting as a test
of the recording system. The use and value of the system lies
in the fact that one who looks carefully into the record is protected even against a real owner, provided there is nothing to
put him on notice as to another's claim. Thus, in the present
case, had there been nothing more than the recorded deeds, the
plaintiff would have lost his case. The case depends, as do
most cases where record is involved, upon the question of
notice. Notice may be actual or constructive, the former explaining itself, the latter proceeding from extraneous facts
which should put an ordinarily diligent man on inquiry. Tiffany, Prop., pp. 476-9; Pomeroy, Equity, pp. 597, 6o4. Pomeroy distinguishes four kinds of constructive notice, the most
important being that arising from possession of the disputed
territory. . Where the claimant is actually in possession of the
land bought, it is everywhere settled that the purchaser is put
on notice. Noyes v. Hall, 7 Otto, 34, 38; Webber v. Taylor, 2
Jones Eq. 9In the present case whatever possession confronted the purchasef was that of the claimant's tenants-a rather slender fact
on which to build up a case of constructive notice. The Court
held this sufficient, however, to warn a prospective purchaser,
and thereby followed the larger number of American cases
which impose the duty of inquiry as to the tenant's rights.
Poneroy Eq. Jur., p. 618: Cunnimngham v. Pattee,'99 Mass. 248.
It seems an unfortunate view, imposing as it does so minute a
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task upon every purchaser, and interfering with the real aim
of the recording acts; so that the minority view, which follows
the English decisions on the subject, (Jones v. Smith, i Hare,
43, 63,) seems at first sight at least to be more just. Certainly,
the careless party in the present case was he who failed to
record his deed.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
The plaintiff, a riparian owner along the San Pedro River in
Arizona, sought to enjoin the defendant, a non-riparian owner,
from appropriating water by means of a dam and
Rip"iOn
ditch through plaintiff's property. In answer to
litting with the plaintiff's contentions the Court held that,
Approprltlon though the plaintiff had secured his grant from
the Mexican Government before the cession of
Arizona to the United States, yet even at that time the doctrine
of appropriation was in force; also that the subsequent patent
from the United States merely confirmed the Mexican title;
and though the English Common Law had been adopted by the
Arizona Code, yet this did not include the doctrine of riparian
rights, in view of the Bill of Rights and other sections of the
Code. Boquilla Co. v. Curtis, 29 Superior Court, 493.
The doctrine of appropriation in relation to watercourses is
in conflict with all common law theory, and owes its origin to
the peculiar natural conditions existing in some of the Western
States and Canada. According to this doctrine, the extent of
an appropriator's right is measured by the extent of his original appropriation. Atchison v. Peterson, 20 Wall. 514; and
priority in time determines priority of right among several
appropriators. Egan v. Estrada, 56 Pac. 721. It is also well
settled that an appropriator need not be a riparian owner.
Krall v. U. S., 79 Fed. 241; Smith v. Deniff, 24 Mont. 2o; but
may divert the water by dams and ditches. Nevada Water Co.
v. Powell, 34 Cal. io9. Therefore, the plaintiff endeavored to
establish that the English Common Law was in force by virtue
of the Arizona Code; but the doctrine of appropriation had
alfeady been recognized in Arizona in the case oi Hill v. Lenormand, 2 Ariz. 354, and the Court decided that it had existed
even under the .Mexican Government. And the United States
patent c-tlu.l not help the plaintiff, since a patent on the "footing
of an -earlier grant by a former sovereign does not intend or
purport to enlarge the grant"
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